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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND DESCRIPTION
OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This

respondent

adopts

the

statement

contained

in

the

appellant's brief with respect to jurisdiction and a description
of the proceedings below.

Unless otherwise noted, Martin Stern,

Jr. AIA Architect and Associates shall be referred to as "Martin
Stern"

or "respondent".

The term appellant shall be used to

refer to plaintiff/appellant James Sanchez.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
This

respondent does not contest the statement

of issues

presented for review described by appellant in his brief.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. ORDINANCES
AND RULES
In addition to the constitutional and statutory provisions
identified by appellant in his brief, the following provisions
are

relevant

respecting

Issue

No.

4 presented

in appellant' s

brief:
Utah Code Ann. 78-12-35. EFFECT OF ABSENCE FROM STATE.
Where a cause of action accrues against a
person when he is out of the state, the
action may be commenced within the term that
is limited by this chapter after his return
to the state.
If after a cause of action
accrues he departs from the state, the time
of his absence is not part of the time
limited for the commencement of the action.
Constitution of the United States, Article I, Section 8:
The Congress shall have Power . . .
To regulate commerce with foreign nations,
and among the several States, and with the
Indian tribes. . . .

1

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2305. 15 (Supp, 1987):
When a cause of action accrues against a
person, if he is out of the state, has
absconded, or conceals himself, the period of
limitation for the commencement of the action
as provided in Sections 2305. 04 to 2305. 14,
1302. 98, and 1304. 29 of the Revised Code,
does not begin to run until he comes into the
state or while he is so absconded or
concealed. After the cause of action accrues
if he departs from the state, absconds, or
conceals himself, the time of his absence or
concealment shall not be computed as any part
of a period within which the action must be
brought.
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES
PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Respondent generally accepts the Statement of Facts Relevant
to the Issues Presented for Review as set forth in appellant' s
brief as supplemented herein:
1.

Defendant Martin Stern, Jr. AIA Architect & Associates

is a professional corporation incorporated under the laws of the
State of California with its principal place of business in the
State of California.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Utah
properly

Code Annotated

78-12-25. 5 is

applied by the district

claims on summary judgment.
Associates

(hereafter

constitutional

court to dismiss

and was

plaintiff' s

Martin Stern, Jr. AIA Architect &

"Martin

Stern"),

in

the

interest

of

brevity, adopts the arguments made and authorities cited in the
superior
including
decisis,

brief

of

co-defendant

the arguments
the

open

Okland

predicated

courts

analysis
2

Construction

Company,

upon the doctrine

of stare

and

the

equal

protection

analysis advanced therein.
Martin Stern joins with Okland Construction with respect to
Point

II

of

Okland' s

brief

regarding

the

summary

judgment

granted to Okland against Little America Hotel on the claims for
indemnification.
against

the

Martin Stern did not joint Okland in its motion

claims

raised

against

Martin

Stern

on

the

same

theories because Martin Stern elected to first clarify through
additional

discovery

contractual
America.

that

there is

indemnification

no basis

against

Martin

for a claim
Stern

by

for

Little

As Martin Stern will advance the same argument made by

Okland Construction in due course, it joins with Okland in the
arguments advanced in Okland' s brief.
There was no basis to deny Martin Stern7 s motion for summary
judgment against plaintiff under the provisions of §78-12-35, a
provision

which

purports

to

toll

applicable

statutes

limitation against persons when they are out of the state.
Supreme

Court

provisions

of

such

as

the

United

§78-12-35

States

has

present

an

recently

of
The

ruled

that

unconstitutional

and

unwarranted restriction upon interstate commence when applied to
a

corporate

circumstances.

defendant

such

The summary

as

Martin

judgment

therefore be affirmed.

3

Stern

under

of the trial

these

court must

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
MARTIN STERN IS NOT PRECLUDED FROM RAISING
THE STATUTE OF REPOSE AT 78-12-25. 5 FOR
HAVING FAILED TO PLEAD SAME.
In the district court and in his docketing statement filed
with this court, plaintiff asserted that defendant Martin Stern
failed to plead the statute of repose at 78-12-25.5 U. C. A. , as
amended,

in

its

answer,

and

could

therefore

motion for summary judgment upon the same.

not

predicate

a

After discussions

between counsel, plaintiff has dropped this issue from his brief,
recognizing that Martin Stern did in fact plead the statute of
repose

in its

dated April

answer

15, 1988.

to plaintiff s Second

Amended

Complaint

Therein, in the second defense, Martin

Stern alleged:
Second Defense
Plaintiff' s claims against this defendant are
barred by virtue of the provisions of §78-1225.5 U. C. A. , 1953 as amended, for the reason
that more than seven (7) years have elapsed
after the completion of construction of the
swimming pool and sauna and/or other
improvements to real property which form the
basis for plaintiff7 s claims.
Martin Stern's understanding is that plaintiff has dropped
this aspect of his appeal after recognizing that the statute of
repose

actually

was

pled

in the only

response

Martin Stern to any claim of plaintiff against it.

ever

filed by

Martin Stern

intends that there be no confusion or misunderstanding in this
appeal that it did plead the statute of repose as an affirmative
defense to plaintiff' s complaint.
4

POINT II.
UTAH C O D E A N N O T A T E D
578-12-25.5
IS
CONSTITUTIONAL AND PROPERLY SUPPORTS THE
GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO MARTIN STERN.
As

has

been noted

in the brief

of Okland,

endowed with a strong presumption of validity.
be declared

unconstitutional

statutes

are

They should not

if there is any reasonable basis

upon which they can be found to come within the constitutional
framework.

Murray Citv v. Hall, 663 P. 2d 1314 (Utah 1983).

Indeed,

the

Colorado

Supreme

Court,

in

evaluating

a

challenge similar to that raised by plaintiff here against the
Colorado statute of repose for architects and contractors stated
that "[w]e note that the statute is presumed to be constitutional
and the plaintiff bears the burden of proving unconstitutionality
beyond

a reasonable

Hilton Hotels

doubt. "

Corp.,

(citations

omitted. )

655 P. 2d 822, 824-825

Yarbro v.

(Supreme Court of

Colorado, En Banc, 1982) (reh. den. 1983. )
In

the

repetition,
advanced

interest
Martin

of

brevity

Stern

hereby

in the superior brief

and

to

avoid

incorporates

unnecessary

the

filed by Donald J.

arguments
Purser and

Dwight C. Packard of and for Purser, Okazaki & Berrett, counsel
for

defendant/respondent

Stern borrows

Okland

Construction

Company.

Martin

from the brief of co-respondent Okland with the

permission of its counsel and specifically incorporates all of
Point

I

of

incorporation

Okland' s
is

brief

intended

to

hereat

by

incorporate

reference.
Okland' s

This

arguments

respecting the doctrine of stare decisis, its argument respecting
5

the open courts provisions of the Constitution of Utah and its
arguments

respecting

the

equal

protection

provisions

of

the

Constitution of Utah and the Constitution of the United States.
In further support of those arguments, Martin Stern notes
that

this

court

was

presented

with

a

further

opportunity

to

address the constitutionality of the statute of repose at §78-1225. 5

U. C. A.

upon

arguments

predicated

upon

Berry

v

Beech

Aircraft Corp. , 717 P. 2d 670 (Utah 1985) in the case Jackson v.
Lavton City. 743 P. 2d 1196 (Utah 1987).
the argument may have been raised

While it appears that

for the first time on oral

argument, this court' s opinion does not indicate that the court
declined to consider the arguments advanced on that basis.
In

Jackson,

plaintiffs

asserted

that

the

seven

(7) year

statute of repose extended their time for bringing suit against
an owner m

possession which had also planned and constructed the

improvements
injuries.

claimed

to

have

caused

plaintiffs'

personal

The court noted that the Jacksons had an effective

remedy against Layton City as owner in possession of the property
that could have been filed within four years from the date of
plaintiffs' injuries.
Berry

v.

Beech

Thus the plaintiffs were unable to invoke

Aircraft

Corp. ,

constitutionality of 78-12-25. 5.

s upra,

to

attack

the

This court affirmed the trial

court ruling under 78-12-25. 5 that dismissed Jacksons'

actions

against Layton City as the improver of the property because, from
the record, it appeared that the subject improvements had been
completed

for over seven

(7) years
6

before the Jacksons

filed

their Complaint.
The decision of the Colorado
Hilton

Hotels

Corp.,

655

P. 2d

Supreme Court in Yarbro v.

822,

supra,

fully

addressed

arguments attacking the constitutionality of a similar Colorado
statute of repose respecting architects

and contractors.

The

Colorado statute, as here, was challenged on both due process and
equal protection grounds.
In addressing the due process arguments, the Colorado court
observed that limitations of liability for architects and others
similarly

situated

public purpose.

by

reasonable

655 P. 2d 825.

means

do

serve

a legitimate

Citing Rosenberg v. Town of North

Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 293 A. 2d 662 (1972).

The court noted:

There comes a time when [the defendant] ought
to be secure in his reasonable expectation
that the slate has been wiped clean of
ancient obligations, and he ought not to be
called to resist a claim when "evidence has
been lost, memories have faded and witnesses
have disappeared."
61 N.J. at 201, 293 A. 2d
at 667-668 (1972) quoting Developments in the
Law, Statutes of Limitations, 63 Harv. L. Rev.
1177, 1185 (1950).
655

P. 2d

825.

The

court

further

noted,

quoting

Mishek v.

Stanton. 616 P. 2d 135, 138 (Colo. 1980):
The general rule is that a statute of
limitations . . . does not violate due
process "unless the time fixed by the statute
is manifestly so limited as to amount to a
denial of justice . . . .
The legislature is
the primary judge of whether the time allowed
is reasonable. "
Qberst v. Mays, 148
Colo. 285, 292, 365 P. 2d 902, 905 (citations
omitted)
655 P. 2d 825.

The Colorado court noted that since construction

projects generally have expected useful lives of many decades,

possibilities for long term liability for builders and architects
are

enormous.

The

court

affirmed

the policy

adopted

by the

General Assembly of Colorado to limit the extended exposure to
liability of these persons by barring suits against architects
brought without the period of repose specified in the statute.
Because

the

Colorado

statute

was

rationally

related

to

a

permissible state objective, it did not violate due process.
Similarly,
rationally

the

Utah

statute

of

related to and furthers

repose

at

78-12-25.5

the same permissible

is

state

objective and does not violate due process of the law.
The

Yarbro

court

similarly

dismissed

the

related

"open

courts" argument raised by the plaintiff in that action, noting
that

as

the

architect

or

statute

applied

contractor

and

to
to

nonvested
vested

rights

rights

to

which

sue

were

an
not

timely prosecuted, the statute did not violate the open courts
provision

of

the

Colorado

Constitution.

That

provision

is

similar in effect to Article I, Section 11 of the Constitution of
Utah.

The Yarbro court held .that since the time for filing suit

against the architect in that case had lapsed pursuant to the
statute prior to the time of the plaintiff' s/decedent' s injuries,
the cause of action against the architect never arose or vested.
655 P. 2d 827.

The court thus rejected the argument attacking the

referenced statute of repose predicated upon the Colorado open
courts

provision.

This

court

should

reject

plaintiff's

arguments on the same basis because, as noted in the brief of
Okland, plaintiff has not been denied a remedy against the owner
8

of the property.
The Yarbro court also addressed an attack on the statute of
repose on equal protection grounds.
argued

that

classification

the
of

statute

As here, plaintiff Yarbro

granted

defendants

immunity

without

a

to

rational

a

certain

basis.

The

Yarbro court noted that since no fundamental right or class such
as race, sex or national origin was involved,

scrutiny of the

statute was based upon the inquiry as to whether the statutory
classification
objective.
17,

was

reasonably

related

to

a

legitimate

state

655 P. 2d 827 citing Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1,

99 S. Ct.

887, 898, 59 L. Ed. 2d 100

(1979);

New Orleans v.

Duke, 427 U. S. 297, 303-304, 96 S. Ct. 2513, 2516-2517, 49 L. Ed. 2d
511 (1976); Cudahy Co. v. Ragnar Benson, Inc. , 514 F. Supp. 1212,
1217 (D.Colo. 1981).

655 P. 2d 827.

The Yarbro court, as previously observed by Okland in its
brief,

noted

the

rational

basis

for

a

distinction

between

architects and contractors on one hand and materialmen and owners
on the other.

Beyond the reasons discussed in the Yarbro case,

the following other factors should be considered which justify
the rationality of the distinction:
1.
of

Builders and architects are subjected to a broad scope

liability

which

requires

limitation.

As

noted

by

the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong
Cork Co. , 382 A. 2d 715 (Pa. 1976):
The scope of liability of the class
builders differs significantly from that
the class of owners.
First, the class
persons to whom builders may be liable
9

of
of
of
is

larger than the class to which owners may be
liable.
Landowners may be liable to others
who come onto their land. Builders, however,
may be liable both to the landowners and to
others who use the land.
Second, a builder
may be liable for construction defects under
various legal theories -- contract, warranty,
negligence, and perhaps strict liability in
tort.
Landowner liability for such defects,
on the other hand, typically lies only in
tort, unless the land owner is a lessor, in
which case he is liable only for events
occurring while the tenant is in possession.
382 A. 2d 718.
(Cal.App.

See also Barnhous v. Pinole,

1982);

Cheswold

Volunteer

Fire

183 Cal. Rptr. 881
Co.

v.

Lambertson

Construction Co. , 489 A. 2d 413 (Del. 1984); Beecher v. White. 417
N. E. 2d 662 (Ind. App.
2.

1983).

It is rational to limit the liability of builders and

architects

since they have no control over the building after

relinquishing it to the owner.
accepts

the

finished

product,

After the owner of a structure
the

architect

has

no

right

to

control the number and type of persons entering the building or
to regulate the condition of entry.

Following acceptance of the

completed structure, there is a possibility of neglect, abuse,
poor

maintenance,

The architect

improper

modification

and

unskilled

repair.

and builder have no opportunity to make ongoing

inspections or to control these factors.

These distinctions have

been recognized and accepted by a number of courts in sustaining
the

constitutionality

statutes of repose.

of

their

respective

state

architects'

See Barnhous v. Pinole, supra; Yarbro v.

Hilton Hotels Corp., 655 P. 2d 822, supra and Cheswold Volunteer
Fire Co. v. Lambertson Construction Co. , gupra.
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3.

Statistically a seven (7) year period in which to bring

an action against an architect will encompass almost ail claims
that

will

arise.

As

noted

in Okland' s brief,

Congressional

studies have indicated that the overwhelming majority of claims
brought against architects are brought within seven (7) years of
completion of construction.
the

design

or

construction

This is true because most defects in
of

manifest within seven (7) years.
6678

and

H. R.

11544

before

improvements

to

real

property

See Hearing on H. R. 6527. H. R.

Subcommittee

No.

1 of

the

House

Committee on the District of Columbia, 90th Cong., 1st Session 28
(1967).
4.

Buildings may last for literally hundreds of years and

a limitation is needed to eliminate perpetual liability on the
part of architects.

This is especially apparent given problems

of proof in defending stale claims.

As noted in Okland' s brief,

there are already problems of proof presented in this case with
respect to the routine destruction of city building inspection
records
premises

and

the

death

on behalf

Okland, page 15:

of

of Salt

the

inspector

who

inspected

Lake City Corporation.

these

Brief of

Transcript of Hearing on Motions for Summary

Judgment, page 6; Record at 513.
5.

The statute under consideration promotes innovation and

experimentation to the end of improving design and construction
of improvements to real property.

As noted in 0' Brien v. Hazelet

& Erdal, 299 N. W. 2d 336, 342 (Mich. 1980):
Innovations are usually accompanied by some
unavoidable risk. Design creativity might be
11

stifled if architects and engineers labored
under
the
fear that
every
untried
configuration might have unsuspected flaws
that could lead to liability decades later.
Cited in Yarbro v. Hilton Hotels, 655 P. 2d 822, 828.
There is no question that the statute enacted by the Utah
Legislature to secure repose from actions against architects and
contractors
completed

after

improvements

to

for more than seven years

real

property

is rationally

accomplish legitimate legislative objectives.

have

been

related to

The statute thus

passes muster under the equal protection clauses of both state
and federal constitutions.

For these reasons and based upon the

reasons and arguments cited in the brief of Okland, the appeal of
Sanchez with respect to the constitutionality of 78-12-25.5 must
be denied and the order of the district court granting summary
judgment to Martin Stern must be affirmed.
POINT III.
THE PROVISIONS OF U. C. A. 78-12-35
TOLLING STATUTE) MAY NOT OPERATE TO
MARTIN STERN SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

(THE
DENY

Plaintiff argues that the district court's summary judgment
order in favor of Martin Stern was inappropriate and/or premature
because it has not been established in the record whether Martin
Stern, a California corporation, ceased doing business in Utah
after

it

completed

its

work

on

the

Little

America

project.

Plaintiff relies upon the tolling statute found at 78-12-35.
Plaintiff7 s argument

fails

and Martin

Stern was

properly

entitled to summary judgment because, as applied to Martin Stern,
the tolling provisions

of 78-12-35 are unconstitutional
12

as an

impermissible restriction upon interstate commerce under the rule
of Bendix Autolite Corp, v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc.,
U.S.

; 108 S. Ct. 2218; 100 L. Ed. 2d 896, 56 U. S. L. W. 4648,

Westlaw:

1988 W. L. 59900 (U.S.) (decided June 17, 1988).

In Bendix Autolite, Bendix sued an Illinois corporation not
qualified

to

do

business

in Ohio

for

breach

of

relation to a boiler which had been installed
Ohio.

Midwesco.

Midwesco

limitations as a defense.
not

run

because

asserted

the

in

by Midwesco in

Bendix brought suit in federal district

against

contract

court in Ohio

Ohio

statute

of

Bendix argued that the limitation did

Midwesco

was

an

Illinois

corporation

not

qualified in Ohio and therefore the running of the statute of
limitations
Revised
1953.

Code

was

tolled

similar

to

pursuant
the

to

a provision

provisions

of

in

§78-12-35

the

Ohio

U. C. A. ,

X

The Supreme Court of the United States held that states may

Ohio Rev.

Code Ann.

§2305. 15

(Supp.

1987) provides as

follows:
When a cause of action accrues against a
person, if he is out of the state, has
absconded, or conceals himself, the period of
limitation for the commencement of the action
as provided in Sections 2305. 04 to 2305. 14,
1302. 98, and 1304. 29 of the Revised Code,
does not begin to run until he comes into the
state or while he is so absconded or
concealed. After the cause of action accrues
if he departs from the state, absconds, or
conceals himself, the time of his absence or
concealment shall not be computed as any part
of a period within which the action must be
brought.
13

not withdraw defenses predicated upon statutes of limitations on
conditions repugnant to the Commerce Clause, Article I, Section 8
of the Constitution of the United States.

In holding that the

Ohio statute was unconstitutional, the Supreme Court noted that
the

burden

that

the

tolling

commerce was significant.

statute

placed

upon

interstate

It stated:

The Ohio statutory scheme thus forces a
foreign corporation to choose between
exposure to the general jurisdiction of Ohio
courts (by appointing a resident agent for
service of process and qualifying to do
business in Ohio) or forfeiture of the
limitations defense, remaining subject to
suit in Ohio in perpetuity.
Requiring a
foreign corporation to appoint an agent for
service in all cases and to defend itself
with reference to all transactions, including
those in which it did not have the minimum
contacts necessary for supporting personal
jurisdiction, is a significant burden,
(citation omitted.) 56 L. W. 4650, 108 S. Ct.
2221
The court further noted:
In the particular case before us, the Ohio
tolling statute must fall under the Commerce
Clause. Ohio cannot justify its statute as a
means of protecting its residents from
corporations who become liable for acts done
in the State but later withdraw from the
jurisdiction, for it is conceded by all
parties that the Ohio long arm statute would
have permitted service on Midwesco throughout
the period of limitations.
The Ohio statute
of limitations is tolled only for those
foreign corporations that do not subject
themselves to the general jurisdiction of
Ohio courts. In this manner the Ohio statute
imposes a greater burden upon out-of-state
companies than it does upon Ohio companies,
subjecting the activities of foreign and
domestic corporations to inconsistent
regulations.
(citation omitted. )
56 LW
4650, 108 S.Ct. 2222
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Like the Ohio statute, the provisions of §78-12-35 U C A
require

that

registering
subjecting

a

foreign

corporation

choose

between

and qualifying to do business m
itself

to the jurisdiction

(1)

Utah and thereby

of Utah

courts

for all

purposes, or (2) remaining subject to suit in Utah in perpetuity
for acts committed in Utah for which long arm jurisdiction is
available.

Thus,

discriminates
imposes

like

between

an

35

are

Ohio

foreign

unnecessary

interstate commerce

the

and

statute,

and

the

domestic

Utah

statute

corporations

unconstitutional

burden

and
upon

For that reason, the provisions of §78-12-

unconstitutional

as

applied

to

Martin

Stern

in

these

circumstances.
Defendant' s Motion for summary Judgment should not have been
denied on the basis of §78-12-35 even if Martin Stern was absent
from the state of Utah from the very day it completed its work on
the Little America Hotel to the present
question

is

presented

as

California

corporation,

completion

of

the

No material

to whether

or

was

from

Little

absent

America

not

Martin

this

Hotel.

factual

Stern,

state

The

a

after

appeal

of

plaintiff /appellant on this issue must be denied and the order
granting

Martin

Stern's

summary

judgment

by

the

trial

court

affirmed
POINT IV
MARTIN STERN JOINS IN THE ARGUMENTS OF OKLAND
CONSTRUCTION
WITH
RESPECT
TO
THE
INDEMNIFICATION CLAIMS OF LITTLE AMERICA
HOTEL CORPORATION
Little America Hotel Corporation has raised similar claims
15

for indemnification against Martin Stern as those under review in
the appeal by Little America of the trial court' s order granting
Okland Construction summary judgment.

Martin Stern did not file

its own motion for summary judgment against Little America on the
indemnification

claims

in

the

interest

of

conducting

further

discovery to establish that there was no basis for a claim of
contractual

indemnification

by

Little

America

against

Martin

Stern.
It is likely, at the appropriate time after completion of
discovery relevant to this issue, that Martin Stern will file a
motion similar

to that previously

Construction.

in favor of Okland

Martin Stern therefore supports and joins in the

arguments

of

America7 s

claims

implied

granted

Okland

and/or

for

Construction
contractual

equitable

to

the

effect

that

indemnification,

indemnification

are

Little

express

barred

by

or
the

statute of repose at 78-12-25.5.
CONCLUSION
The statute of repose for architects and builders at 78-1225. 5 is not unconstitutional under an open courts analysis, an
equal protection analysis or a due process analysis.

Plaintiff

is not denied a remedy because he can still sue the owner and/or
materialmen who are not subject to the statute of repose.

The

statute of repose serves legitimate state objectives and social
policy as declared by the Legislature of the State of Utah.
statute

of

repose

social policy

is

reasonably

objectives, and does
16

related

to

not unduly

those

The

legitimate

or irrationally

discriminate in favor of architects and builders.
Plaintiff's

appeal must be denied as respects the tolling

provisions of U. C. A. 78-12-35 for the reason that the same, as
applied

to Martin

Stern,

are

an unconstitutional

burden upon

interstate commerce in violation of Article I, Section 8 of the
Constitution of the United States under recent and controlling
authority announced by the Supreme Court of the United States.
The

appeals

of

plaintiff

and

co-defendant

Little

America

Corporation should be denied and the orders of the trial court
affirmed.

*l

DATED this J ^ l ^

day of April, 1989.
Respectfully submitted,

^

^

X
Jefftybyf $ L. Silvestrini
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
Attorneys for Respondent Martin
Stern, Jr. AIA Architect &
Associates, Inc.
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Jeffrey L. Silvestrini (Bar No. 2959)
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
525 East First South, Fifth Floor
P.O.Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
Telephone:(801) 532-2666
Attorney for Defendants Martin Stern, Jr.
and AIA Architect & Associates
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * *

JAMES SANCHEZ,
ANSWER OF
MARTIN STERN, JR., AIA,
ARCHITECT & ASSOCIATES
TO SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff,
vs

LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL
CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation, MARTIN STERN, JR.
AND AIA ARCHITECT & ASSOCIATES,
OKLAND CONSTRUCTION CO., a Utah
corporation, ROCKY MOUNTAIN
POOLS, INC., a Utah corporation,
HIGHAM-HILTON MECHANICAL
CONTRACTORS, INC., a Utah
corporation and
JOHN DOES I THROUGH in,

Civil No. C87-268
Judge David S. Young

Defendants.
* * * * * * * *

Defendant

Martin Stern, Jr., AIA, Architect <5c Associates, a California

professional corporation, through its counsel Jeffrey L. Silvestrini of and for Cohne,
Rappaport 6c Segal responds to the Second Amended Complaint of plaintiff as follows:
FIRST DEFENSE
Plaintiffs Complaint fails to state claims for relief against this defendant upon
which relief can be granted.

SECOND DEFENSE
Plaintiffs claims against this defendant are barred by virtue of the provisions of
§78-12-25.5 U.C.A., 1953 as amended, for the reason that more than seven (7) years have
elapsed after the completion of construction of the swimming pool and sauna and/or
other improvements to real property which form the basis for plaintiffs claims.
THIRD DEFENSE
Defendant responds to the specific allegations of plaintiffs Complaint as follows:
1.

In response to paragraph 2 of the Second Amended Complaint, this defendant

asserts that the party which contracted with Little America Corporation and/or Little
America

Refining

Company for

architectural services in connection with the

construction of the Little America Hotel is Martin Stern, Jr., AIA, Architect <3c
Associates, a California professional corporation, and not Martin Stern,, Jr. & Associates,
a California partnership. Martin Stern, Jr., AIA, Architect <5c Associates, a corporation,
admits this court's jurisdiction over it in connection with tfie Little America Hotel
pursuant to 78-27-24 et seq., U.C.A., 1953. This defendant denies that it is regularly
engaged in the business of designing pools and saunas as part of its architectural design
service as further alleged in paragraph 2.
2.

This defendant denies the allegations of paragraphs 37, 38, 39, 41, 42, 44, 45,

46, 47, 49, 50, 51, 53, 53 (second paragraph numbered 53), 55, 56, 57 and 58.
3.

In response to the allegations of paragraphs 24, 27, 32, 36, 40, 43, 48, 52, 54,

59, 63, 66, 71, 75, 78, 83, 87, 90, 95, 99 and 102, this defendant reincorporates by
reference its response to the paragraphs referenced therein.
4.

This defendant lacks information to form an opinion as to all remaining

allegations of the Second Amended Complaint and therefore denies the same in their

-2-

entirety.
FOURTH DEFENSE
Plaintiffs claims against this defendant are barred under the doctrine of
comparative negligence as the negligence of plaintiff equalled or exceeded that of
defendants and this defendant in particular.
FIFTH DEFENSE
Plaintiff has a duty to mitigate his damages and to the extent he has not done so,
this defendant is entitled to a defense or offset against plaintiffs claims herein.
SIXTH DEFENSE
Given the length of time that has elapsed since the improvements which are the
subject of this action were designed and constructed, plaintiffs claims hereunder are
barred under the doctrine of laches.
SEVENTH DEFENSE
Plaintiffs claims against this defendant are barred by virtue of plaintiffs
assumption of the risk related to his conduct and plaintiffs claims are therefore barred
under the Utah comparative negligence statute.
EIGHTH DEFENSE
The instant project, insofar as the pool and sauna were concerned, was a designbuild project implemented by a party or parties other than this defendant, subject only to
the general scheme for floor plan and layout and other similar criteria provided by this
defendant.
NINTH DEFENSE
Plaintiffs damages were caused or contributed to by persons, conditions or acts
outside of the control of this defendant.
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TENTH DEFENSE
Any of plaintiffs claims of breach of any express or implied warranty are barred
by virtue of the provisions of §§70A-2-316, 70A-2-317, 70A-2-607 and 70A-2-725,
U.C.A., 1953.
DATED this / J

/
day of April, 1988.

COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
Attorneys for Defendants
Martin Stern, Jr., AIA
Architect & Associates and
Martin Stern, Jr.
MAILING CERTIFICATE
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was
mailed, postage fully prepaid, on the iS-^-flay of April, 1988 to the following:
Dale F. Gardiner
Robert J. DeBry
Robert J, DeBry & Associates
Attorneys for Plaintiff
4001 South 700 East, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Paul M. Belnap
Strong & Hanni
Attorneys for Little America Hotel, Inc. and Little America Refining
Sixth Floor, Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Donald J. Purser, Esq.
39 Post Office Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

